Evaluation of the American Campaign against ISIS and Its Chances of Success

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1. President Obama has set the US the clear, but in ITIC assessment pretentious, goal of destroying ISIS with a comprehensive campaign of several years. By setting the final goal as the destruction of ISIS, he has created high expectations for his and the next administration. Their ability to meet the expectations is of great importance. That is because the campaign extends beyond the narrow perspective of the war on terrorism, and its outcome will affect the America’s status the Middle East and around the globe for years to come. Thus not only is President Obama’s foreign policy being tested, but the image of American regional and international power also faces a significant challenge.

2. One question is whether the United States will succeed in the campaign against ISIS and realize the strategic goals set forth by President Obama. In ITIC assessment it will be very difficult for America to achieve all the goals it set for itself, for the following reasons:

A. The political assumptions and goals, both declared and undeclared, which are at the root of the campaign against ISIS seem to be unrealistic:

1) The intention to establish a central democratic regime in Iraq, which will impose its control over the whole country, failed even during the years the US maintained a large military force in Iraq. The current goal is even more unrealistic, after the US has withdrawn its troops from Iraq and the country is divided into its religious-sectarian components.^[1]

2) As for Syria, it is impossible to rely on the so-called moderate rebel organizations to eradicate ISIS. That is because those organizations are fragmented, their military capabilities are limited and they lack effective leadership. Even if American aid strengthens the Western-oriented rebel groups to the point where they may be able to stand up to their enemies more successfully, it is still unlikely that they will be able to overcome the Assad regime and ISIS and other jihadi organizations.

B. The difficulty of uprooting an organization with a Salafist-jihadi ideology like ISIS: ISIS is not just an isolated terrorist organization whose influence is confined to a single territorial area. It is an organization with a radical Islamic ideology supported by Sunni population groups and drawing its strength from the disintegration of the social and governmental systems in Iraq, Syria and the Middle East as a whole. In Afghanistan and Pakistan the United States also failed to uproot the global jihad, although it did manage to weaken Al-Qaeda after it had invested considerable resources and a prolonged military presence (which is now coming to an end).^[2] Foreign fighters also join ISIS because of the political and social distress in the Arab-Muslim world and in Muslim communities in the West, and therefore it is not enough to streamline counterterrorist measures and strengthen international cooperation.

C. The limitations of military force in fighting against terrorist organizations: Aerial attacks against an organization such as ISIS, which has a well-formulated ideological worldview and enjoys the support of Sunni population groups, cannot lead to its elimination. In the Second Lebanon War and Operation Protective Edge, Israel learned the limits of military power in fighting Hezbollah and Hamas. Both are radical Islamist terrorist organizations, one Shi’ite and the other Sunni, which are firmly rooted within the local populations. Moreover, in ITIC assessment even the massive military involvement of American troops in Iraq and Syria (currently not on the agenda) would not lead to the elimination of ISIS and the establishment of stable regimes (during its stay in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American army learned firsthand the limits of military force in imposing law and order and establishing an effective central government in societies divided both politically and socially).

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D. The basic weakness of the local power centers that the United States relies on:

1)  The Iraqi Army, in whose establishment the US has invested considerable resources and power, remains unmotivated and does not enjoy legitimacy among Sunni Muslims. The Iraqi Army may prove effective in protecting Baghdad and Shi’ite population centers, but not in occupying and controlling the Sunni areas where ISIS is based. It is doubtful whether additional American investments of money, military equipment and advisors to strengthen the Iraqi Army would change this basic situation.

2)  The Kurdish Peshmerga forces may prove effective in protecting the Kurdish autonomous region, and possibly also in limited offensive operations. On the other hand, their effectiveness and motivation will be far lower in operations in Sunni and Shi’ite areas.

3)  The Iranian-supported Shi’ite militias in Iraq may prove effective in protecting Baghdad and Shi’ite population centers. However, military aid to those militias will not provide them with offensive capabilities allowing them to occupy the Sunni areas that ISIS controlled. Moreover, strengthening the Shi’ite militias also come at the price of increasing Iran’s political influence in Iraq.

4)  The so-called moderate Syrian rebel organizations: The organizations are divided organizationally, differ from one another in ideology and are lacking effective (political and military) leadership. Aid from the United States and the West could strengthen their resistance against ISIS and the Syrian regime, but it is doubtful whether it would provide them with significant offensive capabilities against their enemies.

E. The weakness of the coalition supporting the US: It is a heterogeneous coalition with different political interests and constraints, limiting the scope of participation of the various countries. The coalition countries are expected to provide limited aid to the aerial attacks against ISIS. In addition, Turkey, which is of great importance, has interests and political constraints of its own and at least for the time being does to want to be deeply involved in the fight against ISIS. Moreover, in the future, if and when the coalition has to cope with difficulties, some of its members are liable to abandon the campaign. The bottom line is that the US bears the brunt of the fighting and will have to bear the consequences over the years.

F. The major difficulty in effective cooperation with Bashar al-Assad’s regime and with its supporter, Iran:

1)    The Assad regime could have aided in fighting ISIS no less and maybe even more than most of the countries in the coalition and the so-called moderate rebel organizations supported by the United States. However, America regards the Assad regime a factor in the process leading to the establishment of ISIS and the civil war in Syria, and not part of the solution. Cooperation with it is liable to alienate the Americans from the Sunni Muslim population in Syria and undermine United States cooperation with the so-called moderate rebel organizations.

2)    Cooperation with Iran, which has influence and presence in Syria and Iraq, is also politically problematic. Iran supports terrorism, strives for hegemony in the Middle East and to harm American influence in Syria and Iraq and to harm American allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan). Although there may be future tactical collaborations against ISIS with Iran (and the Syrian regime as well), it is difficult to expect them to become key partners in the coalition.

3. Moreover, the American campaign, however long it lasts, is also prone to entanglements, which are integral to the struggle against terrorism. For example, it may increase the motivation of ISIS, global jihad organizations and supporters of ISIS around the world to respond to the aerial attacks with terrorist attacks; it may lead to unintended casualties among the civilian population as a result of the ongoing aerial attacks; the US may be drawn into situations not included in the strategy announced by President Obama and his aides (such as additional American troops getting more deeply sucked into the Iraqi morass and perhaps even the Syrian morass).All of the above are liable tolead to domestic criticism and in Western countries if things go wrong (and they are liable to go wrong), if only because of the very complex, fluid, volatile and changing nature of the civil wars in Syria and Iraq.

4. Beyond all those difficulties, ISIS is a consequence of the disintegration of Syria and Iraq, a part of profound and powerful processes that have occurred in the Middle East in recent years. The processes, known as the Middle East upheaval, have changed the face of the regional political map as it was shaped after World War I and remained for nearly a century. A new order has not yet emerged to replace nation states that have collapsed, and many opposing political and social forces are fighting for power. This is the nature of the morass from which ISIS and other jihadi organizations emerged, and until the morass has been drained, a process that may take many years, it will be impossible to eradicate the weeds.

Written by The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center