Does Israel Have Veto Power Over An Agreement With Iran?

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By Zaki Shalom

On November 8, shortly before meeting U.S Secretary of State John Kerry, Prime Minister Netanyahu made it clear that Israel totally opposed the potential P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran: “I understand the Iranians are walking around very satisfied in Geneva”, he stated.

“[Indeed] they should because they got everything and paid nothing, everything they wanted. They wanted relief of sanctions after years of grueling sanction regime, they got that. They paid nothing because they are not reducing in any way their nuclear enrichment capability. So Iran got the deal of the century and the international community got a bad deal. This is a very bad deal and Israel utterly rejects it.”

He concluded his statement by making it clear that “Israel is not obliged by this agreement and Israel will do everything it needs to do to defend itself and defend the security of its people.”

Following his tense meeting with Kerry, Netanyahu again reiterated his total rejection to the agreement: “I’m absolutely stunned”, he told the reporters. “I think it’s such a monumental mistake… This is the deal of the century for Iran because Iran is essentially given [relief from the sanctions] … that took years to build. … Iran would be giving up at best a few days of enrichment time… That’s a big mistake… It is a historic mistake. It is a grievous historic error. The sanctions regime is gone, and Iran gave nothing.”

For years Israel the and United States had carried out an intensive dialogue over Iran. Basically Israel and the United States share the same position: namely, that the international community should be no means reconcile with the idea that Iran would possess a nuclear military power. Israel was highly satisfied by the statements made by president Obama, that U.S policy towards Iran is based upon prevention rather than containment.

However, Israel always felt it was necessary to give those statements some practical meaning, in a way that would convince the Iranian leadership that the United States is serious about the possibility of using the military option against her. Israel made it clear that it was not opposed in principle to the diplomatic dialogue with Iran. However it strongly believes that the diplomatic course could succeed only if the following two conditions were fulfilled:

• The sanctions against Iran would not be lifted, even partially, before Iran made substantial concessions regarding its nuclear project.
• Iran should be convinced there exists a credible U.S military option against her if, and when, the dialogue failed.

However, in recent years the tendency of both Israel and the United States was to keep their disagreements over Iran discrete. It was clear that both states believed an open discussion which would expose their different views would serve neither government well. At this point, however, when a P5+1 agreement with Iran seems imminent, Netanyahu felt it was necessary to make public his criticism over United States policy towards Iran.

iHLS – Israel Homeland Security

In our view, the United States, and other members of the P5+1 group would have to take very seriously those statements by Netanyahu. In the first place, it is clear that those Israeli views are shared by other leaders in the region. Netanyahu himself stated that this Israeli position “is shared by many many in the region whether or not they express that publicly.” We may assume that he referred, among others, to the leaders of Saudi, Egypt Morocco, the Gulf states, and Jordan. All those states are known as close allies of the United States. Some of them, foremost among them the Saudis, have recently made it clear they were disappointed by U.S policy towards Iran. It seems highly unlikely that the United States could afford itself to ignore those states grievances on United States attitude towards Iran.

In addition Netanyahu tried to convince leaders of the P5+1 to oppose the proposed agreement. According to various reports the French leaders decided to adopt a tougher position towards Teheran. We may assume, though we certainly cannot prove it, that his position was seriously taken into consideration. Furthermore, his phone calls to members of the United States Congress will certainly lead many of them to exert high pressure on president Obama to avoid conclusion of an agreement with Iran that might jeopardize the interests of Israel and other United States allies in the region. Some members of the Congress have already voiced their opposition to the proposed agreement.

Most important in this context is Netanyahu’s clarification that “Israel is not obliged by this agreement and Israel will do everything it needs to do to defend itself and defend the security of its people.” This statement would almost certainly be interpreted by the Iranians (and the P5+1 group) as an Israeli threat to use military power if the agreement would not satisfy its demands. Under these circumstances, it seems likely that Iran would demand from the P5+1 in general, and the United States in particular, some form of guarantee that it will not be attacked militarily at least as long as the agreement was in power.

If indeed Iran would submit such a demand, the United States would have to receive an Israeli commitment to refrain from undertaking a military option at this period of time. This commitment, we believe, would be given only if and when, Israel would at least be partially satisfied with the agreement concluded with Iran. Another possibility is that the United States would compensate Israel for its “approval” of an agreement between the P5+1 and Iran by other means.

For all practical reasons this means that Israel is possessing now some sort of veto power, limited in nature, over an agreement between the P5+1 and Iran. This, we believe, might enable her to ensure that her strategic interests would not be jeopardized by the agreement.

Prof. Zaki Shalom is a senior researcher at the Ben-Gurion Research Institute, Ben-Gurion University and a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security studies, Tel Aviv University.