The U.S has to improve the tools used to bridge nuclear smuggling detection

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The U.S Homeland Security Department needs to improve its research and development process so that it can better address gaps in its framework to find and intercept the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, congressional investigators said in a report released April 6.

According to Fierce HomeLand Security, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said its analysis found that DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO, has shortfalls in its documentation procedures, making it difficult to understand how well its R&D investments are addressing the gaps in the government’s Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, or GNDA.

GNDA is the multilayered framework of 74 independent federal programs, projects and activities that help detect and interdict nuclear smuggling inside the United States, at its borders and abroad.

As of last September, DNDO has committed about $350 million to these projects with about one-third of the funds earmarked to 48 projects designed to detect shielded nuclear material.

DNDO officials said last May it was drafting a long-term research road map and strategy for its shielded detection portfolio – the largest of its portfolios – based on a recommendation from the American Physical Society and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. But GAO said DNDO needs to develop a road map and strategy for its entire R&D program.

For example, CBP told investigators that DNDO has developed prototypes designed to detect multiple types of threats, including radiological, nuclear and contraband, in vehicles. But CBP said it didn’t meet their requirements for use at such ports. Additionally, it wasn’t sure if the prototypes would actually be deployed in the future or if DNDO was testing a theoretical concept, “making it difficult to evaluate the performance of these prototypes.”