Hamas rebuilding itself rapidly

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Hamas and the other terrorist organizations based in Gaza are rehabilitating the military capabilities damaged in Operation Protective Edge through extensive recruitment, the establishment of military units and intensive military training.

Hamas, the other terrorist organizations and the security forces in the Gaza Strip have made efforts in the past months to restore military capabilities damaged during Operation Protective Edge. To that end Hamas has allotted considerable funds, manpower and equipment, despite the lack of resources in the Gaza Strip. The military buildup is particularly blatant in view of the continuing delays in the civilian reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. It clearly shows that Hamas’ priority is the rehabilitation of its military-terrorist capabilities at the expense of civilian needs. Hamas and terrorist organizations are also making an effort to preserve and reinforce public support for their military-terrorist wings and the so-called “armed resistance” by focusing on the battle for the hearts and minds of young Gazans.

These efforts include the following:

1)  Recruiting and training adolescents: The military training camps opened by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, according to Hamas, trained more than 17,000 adolescents between the ages of 15 and 17. They received basic and advanced military training (including the abduction of IDF soldiers and exiting tunnels) and religious indoctrination. Beyond filling the ranks thinned out by Operation Protective Edge, recruiting adolescents is aimed to increase support for Hamas within the population because of the extreme distress prevalent in the Gaza Strip.

2)  Establishing new military frameworks: Hamas has begun constructing its so-called “popular army.” On November 7, 2014, it presented the first battalion, claiming it had 2,500 operatives. The “popular army” is supposed to serve as an auxiliary force for the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in a future confrontation with Israel. Hamas will probably establish another “popular army” battalion. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) have also allegedly established new military frameworks, claiming they are of battalion strength.

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3)  Intensive training exercises carried out within Hamas and the other terrorist organizations: The training stresses storming and taking control of IDF posts near the Gaza Strip border, and abducting IDF soldiers. That is because according to Hamas’ perception, that was the modus operandi that brought achievements during Operation Protective Edge, causing Israel the greatest number of losses. That is also a clear indication of the importance the terrorist organizations give to abducting an Israeli soldier or the body of an Israeli soldier to be used as a bargaining chip for the release of terrorists imprisoned in Israel.

4)  Military training for the Gazan security forces: The Hamas-controlled national security forces finished two officers’ training courses In December 2014. There were 1,000 members in one course and 160 in the other. At one exercise, held in an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades training facility, the graduates simulated taking over an IDF post. On November 30, 2014, graduation exercises were held for 85 participants in a course for personal security; the graduates demonstrated their military skills. The internal security forces are considered by Hamas as an important tool in maintaining control over the Gaza Strip and they cooperate closely with the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military-terrorist wing.

Hamas, its internal security forces and the other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip have publicly announced their recruiting and training efforts, as well as the establishment of new military frameworks. Their main objective is to raise the morale of the Gazan population, which is low because of the delays in civilian reconstruction. Another objective is to send a deterrent message to Israel, indicating that its military capabilities are not only being rehabilitated but expanded as well.

Hamas’ giving priority to its military buildup at the expense of the needs of the civilian population is familiar from the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead. For example, at the time, when the civilian population in the Gaza Strip needed cement to rebuild their houses, Hamas used it to reconstruct its damaged military infrastructure. On November 12, 2009, Khaled Mashaal, head of Hamas’ political bureau, announced that most of Hamas’ efforts would be invested in military reconstruction. He said, “Outwardly the visible picture is talks about reconciliation…and construction; however, the hidden picture is that most of the money and effort is invested in the resistance and military preparations.” Giving priority to the military buildup over critical civilian needs is, in ITIC assessment, a function of the Hamas leadership’s strategic decision, again evident after Operation Protective Edge.

Written by: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center