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Hamas – Domestic Challenges

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Jun 16, 2013

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Over the past few years, Hamas in the Gaza Strip has stood before an array of Salafist-Jihadist organizations and networks which challenge its very existence. These organizations and networks possess two dominant characteristics: First, many of its activists are young and have fought for other organizations and networks. They have defected after being frustrated over the participation of Hamas in the elections, its subsequent refusal to implement Sharia law and their compromises in the struggle against Israel – an example of which can be seen in the understandings obtained after Operation Pillar of Defense. Second, these Salafist-Jihadist activists do not perceive themselves as part of the traditional Palestinian struggle. Thus, they do not function as a national liberation organization focusing on Palestine, unlike Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees. Rather, they function as a part of the Al-Qaeda-sponsored global jihad ideology in order to develop a universal Muslim organization aligned against those who do not share their worldview, including other Muslims.

From the Salafist-Jihadist perspective, any solution that does not include a total surrender to their demands would be considered as total defeat. From Hamas’s perspective, their attempts to satisfy its voters, the ongoing resistance to Israel, the ongoing tension with the Fatah movement and the pressure from the international community may force Hamas to soften their attitude with the Salafist-Jihadist organizations and networks. Whether Hamas increases arrests in order to prevent a detriment to their standing, or whether Hamas does so for the sake of receiving American and European aid and the possible removal from terror organization lists, Hamas’ challenge is clear: it must find a way to bridge the gaps reflected in the negotiation attempts between the different factions taking place in Cairo, while maintaining an aggressive policy – including the continual use of force – such as carrying out selective arrests. These considerations must be implemented in a manner whereby Hamas will not be perceived as treacherous on the one hand, nor submissive to Salafist-Jihadist demands on the other.

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Salafist-Jihadist organizations and networks

The rise of a Salafist-Jihadi platform in recent years from within global organizations and networks, as well as in the Gaza Strip, is manifested, inter alia, in the number of organizations and the degree to which they relate to the global Salafist-Jihadist ideology. The examples are diverse: Jaish Al-Islam, the most prominent amongst the Al-Qaeda and global Jihad affiliated organizations and networks in Gaza; Jaish Al–Ummah, which was founded by retirees of the Popular Resistance committees and is also affiliated with global Jihad; the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, which constitutes a framework for a number Salafist-Jihadist organizations and networks including Al-Tawhid wal Jihad, Ansar al-Sunnah, Jund Ansar Allah, and many others.

Numbers and limitations

It is difficult to estimate the number of Salafist-Jihadist activists operating in the Gaza Strip due to the complexities of drawing a clear line between activists and supporters, a fact that is well observed in the various and contradicting estimates. For instance, in a June 2011 interview with a Salafi leader in the Gaza Strip, he claimed that there were more than 11,000 activists. A similar number, 10,000, was mentioned in August 2011 by Dr. Boaz Ganor from the Inter-Disciplinary Center in Herzliya. Yuval Diskin, former head of the Shin Bet, however, estimated in January 2011 that there are only about 550 active fighters in the Gaza Strip who identify with the Al-Qaeda ideology. As if that were not enough, in September 2012, the French news agency (AFP) reported that there are a mere few hundred Salafists operating in Gaza.

Akram Atallah, a political commentator from Al-Azahar University in Gaza, stated that the arrest of many Salafist-Jihadist’s by Hamas has contributed to the ongoing rocket fire towards Israel. In his opinion, Salafists are well aware that Hamas is not interested in an armed conflict with Israel. Still, it can generally be said that Salafist-Jihadist organizational abilities are limited, their achievements are low and the chance of them constituting an actual threat over Hamas’s control over Gaza is modest. That being said, their importance lies in the limitations they impose on Hamas, and on its military capabilities. Salafist-Jihadist organizations and networks challenge the very platform of Hamas which, one way or the other, is under Israeli and international pressure.

Anti-Hamas statements

In the past few years, the opposition of Salafist-Jihadist organizations against Hamas has been growing, manifested through mutual recriminations and increasing arrests made by Hamas. Examples are abundant: the leader of Ansar al-Sunnah, Abu Qatada al-Maqdisi, has attacked Hamas and said: “Hamas security forces are chasing the Mujahideen who target the enemy.” Another leader in the same organization, Abu Hamza Al-Maqdasi, has also blamed Hamas for thwarting the attempts to unify Salafist-Jihadist organizations and networks in Gaza. In a different interview, an additional leader of the group, Sheikh Abu Abdallah Al-Ansari, said that their brothers from Al-Qaeda, who are dispersed around the world, are on the right path and are the “re-establishers” of the faded religion of Islam. Al-Ansari concluded the interview noting that: “we are all the students of Osama Bin Laden, and are influenced by his school.” It is also worth mentioning that The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem – the framework of Salafist-Jihadist organizations and networks in Gaza – which apparently includes Al-Tawhid wal Jihad, accused Hamas of executing searches and interrogations in the homes of its activists. Furthermore, Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad recently published an announcement stating that Hamas allow Egyptian intelligence personnel to interrogate Salafi detainees at the Ansar facility in the Gaza Strip.

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Clashes with Hamas

The head of the Mujahideen Shura Council Salafi in Gaza, Abu Abdalla, has expressed his anger regarding arrests carried out by Hamas: “It hurts that those who purport to be members of the security apparatus and Muslims turn their daggers towards holy warriors while at the same time continue the calm with the Jews.” Jaish Al–Ummah has also accused Hamas of the arrest and torture of six of its members. In addition, its leader, Sheikh Ismail Hamid announced: “there will be no compromise, the Sheikh will continue in Jihad and in preaching, and he will not be subjected to any political considerations that waste our rights to encourage our enemies.”

An unusual clash occurred on July 2009 in a mosque in Rafah between Hamas, Salafist-Jihadist activists and activists of Jund Ansar Allah. The source of the conflict was in a sermon given by the Salafist-Jihadsit Sheikh, Abdel-Latif Moussa, at Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah. Abdel-Latif Moussa condemned Hamas rigorously and at the end declared the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Palestine. The outcome was a heavy blow for Jund Ansar Allah: 28 Salafist-Jihadists were killed, more than 100 were injured and over 100 were arrested.

Hamas’ response

Since the end of Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012, Hamas continues to work hard in order to force a restrained policy regarding terrorist attacks, while extensively executing arrests. For example, Salafist-Jihadist sources have claimed that Hamas has recently deployed a new military force, a “civilian restraint force”, composed of several hundred activists, in order to prevent, among other things, rocket launching from Gaza. Additionally, Hamas’s Minister of Interior Affairs has openly confirmed, for the first time, the arrest of six Salafi activists suspected of weapons theft and planning terror attacks, in addition to the arrest of dozens of Salafi activists who began a hunger strike in Hamas detention centers. It can only be assumed that the radicalization of Hamas’s policies towards the Salafist-Jihadist organizations and networks is motivated, inter alia, by the possible change on behalf of Israel, manifested with additional facilitations in various aspects, and by a change from the part of the international community manifested in the possibility of removing Hamas from the lists of terrorist organizations, providing funds, encourage investments and the like.

In conclusion, examples for tension are evident both verbally and violently between Salafist-Jihadist organizations and networks and Hamas. It indicates that the rift between the two sides is rooted under the existing circumstances, and has opposing aspects: while Hamas maintains a political governing system, refuses to enforce Sharia law and is inclined to a cease fire with Israel, the Salafist-Jihadist organizations and networks operate from a deep religious and ideological decree. They strive to constitute a global Muslim liberation movement against all those who do not share their views, including Hamas. Be as it may, if a proposed solution does not include the full submission to their demands, they will not cease. For that reason, Hamas’s challenge lays in its capability to maneuver between the restrained use of force while managing a productive dialogue, in a manner that will not categorize itself as traitors to their supporters nor as submissive to Salafist-Jihadist demands.